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Welfare effects of controlling a Classical Swine Fever epidemic in the 
Netherlands 
Abstract 
The Dutch pig market is simulated during a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. A sector-
level market model and a spatial, stochastic epidemiological simulation model are used, 
and the control measures prescribed by European Union legislation are implemented. 
Welfare changes of producers and consumers, and government costs, are calculated. In a 
medium-sized epidemic, Dutch pig producers' surplus increases by EUR 454 mn' 
without export restrictions, although producers within quarantine areas lose. Consumer 
surplus falls by EUR 465 mn. With a ban on live pig exports, pig producers' collective 
loss is EUR 251 mn whereas consumers gain EUR 116 mn. Government costs are also 
lower when exports are banned. The net welfare effects for the Dutch economy relative to 
a non-epidemic situation are EUR -299 mn and EUR -390 mn respectively, without and 
with an export ban. 
Keywords: Sector-level trade model, economic welfare analysis, export restrictions, Classical 
Swine Fever, epidemiological simulation model; 
JEL Classification: Q12, Q13 
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 EUR 1 = $ 0.87 (approx) on 14/5/2001. 
Welfare effects of controlling a Classical Swine Fever epidemic in the 
Netherlands 
Introduction 
Classical swine fever (CSF), known in the US as hog cholera, is a viral disease of pigs. In 
countries where CSF is endemic, it is common practice to vaccinate pigs against the 
disease to avoid serious losses. However, pigs vaccinated with the conventional vaccine 
cannot be distinguished from infected pigs. Therefore, importing countries do not usually 
allow the import of live pigs or fresh pig products from countries that vaccinate against 
CSF (Moening). 
CSF has been largely eradicated from the EU pig population. Current EU policy requires 
rapid control measures involving slaughter of infected and at-risk animals, and quarantine 
zones. Vaccination is banned. Trading partners may close their borders on sanitary 
grounds depending on the control measures used. A partial or total export ban for live 
pigs and fresh pig products would have a disastrous impact on the Dutch pig sector 
(Buijtels and Burrell). 
Various studies have looked at the costs related to an incidental outbreak of a contagious 
animal disease. Garner and Lack, and Mahul and Gohin, calculated the economy-wide 
costs, whereas Berentsen et al. used a partial equilibrium approach to estimate only a 
subset of the indirect costs. Other studies have evaluated eradication programs for 
endemic animal diseases (Ellis, Ebel et al., Miller et al., Andersson et al.). 
This study reports the welfare effects of a small, medium and large CSF epidemic in the 
Netherlands. A partial equilibrium model encompassing the whole chain is used. Welfare 
effects are calculated under three different trade scenarios. In all scenarios, quarantine 
zones are set up around infected farms. In the first scenario, producers outside the 
quarantine zones continue to trade with foreign countries. In the second scenario, trade in 
live pigs stops. The third scenario adds the assumption that 50 % of the export demand 
for live pigs (now banned) is switched to demand for exported pig meat. 
This research estimates the net welfare effects of an outbreak and their distribution over 
different groups. It allows us to investigate whether a trade ban exacerbates the 
consequences of an outbreak, and to consider whether additional control measures to 
reduce an epidemic might be economically justified. 
The 1997-8 Dutch CSF epidemic 
EU minimum measures in the case of CSF 
After the detection of CSF on a pig farm, all pigs on the farm are destroyed. Farmers 
receive compensation equal to the value of the animal as estimated by a government 
assessor. A ban on all animal transport is imposed within a quarantine zone of 10 km 
radius for at least 42 days. Repopulation of the infected farm is not allowed till the 
quarantine zone is lifted. 
Veterinary measures, such as clinical inspection and serological screening, are used for 
all farms in the quarantine zone. Earlier contacts with the infected farm are traced and the 
contact farms inspected. If no new infected farms are detected after all farms have been 
serologically tested, then the quarantine is lifted. 
Extra control measures applied in the Dutch 1997-8 epidemic 
Preventive slaughter is the destruction of the pigs on all neighbouring farms in a fixed 
radius (500 to 1000 m) around a detected farm in order to reduce the spread of the virus 
to other farms. As with infected farms, compensation is paid for the slaughtered pigs 
depending on their estimated value and repopulation of the farm is not allowed until the 
quarantine zone is lifted. Under EU legislation, preventive slaughter is an optional control 
measure. In the Dutch 1997-8 CSF epidemic, preventive slaughter (26 farms) was applied 
within a radius of 1 km around the first two infected farms and was reintroduced after 2 
months (Pruimers). 
Market support measures 
In the 1997-8 epidemic, the prolonged duration of quarantine zones led to animal welfare 
problems. To avoid overcrowding and to reduce the risk of illegal animal movements, 
welfare slaughter was used for 25-kg-ready-to-deliver piglets and for 120-kg-ready-to-
deliver pigs. These healthy pigs were bought at current market price and were destroyed. 
As no animal transport or repopulation were allowed inside a quarantine zone, fattening 
farms remained empty if the quarantine zone lasted for longer than 4 months. 
Methodology 
Model structure and content 
The modelling framework comprises five parts. A spatial, dynamic, stochastic, 
epidemiological model (InterCSF) simulates the spread of the disease and the control 
measures, a micro-economic model (EpiPigFlow) calculates the weekly flow of pigs, a 
micro-economic model (EpiCosts) calculates the control programme costs and changes in 
producer surplus within a quarantine zone, a simulation model of the Dutch pig market 
(DUPIMA) calculates market prices and trade flows, and an Excel worksheet calculates 
the other welfare effects. 
Epidemiological simulation model (InterCSF) 
InterCSF (Jalvingh et al.) depicts all Dutch pig farms, their geographical co-ordinates, 
their farm type (multiplier, finisher, multiplier-finisher or breeding stock farm) and farm 
size. InterCSF simulates the daily spread of CSF between farms by contact (animals, 
vehicles, and persons) and through local spread (neighbouring farms within 1000 m of an 
infected farm have a higher potential risk of infection). The median of the simulation 
model was calibrated on the number of detected cases in the first year of the 1997-8 
Dutch CSF epidemic (Jalvingh et al.). InterCSF allows us to simulate the main disease-
control mechanisms that influence disease spread. Our simulations assume virtually the 
same disease control measures as were applied in the 1997-8 epidemic. 
EpiPigFlow 
EpiPigFlow is written in C++ and links InterCSF and DUPIMA. InterCSF works at farm 
level and on a daily basis, whereas DUPIMA requires weekly market supplies as input. 
To calculate the piglet flow during an epidemic, EpiPigFlow begins with the average 
weekly supply in 1996. Piglets that would have been supplied from inside a quarantine 
zone, or that could not be supplied from outside a quarantine zone due to earlier 
depopulation, are subtracted from this figure. Dutch demand for piglets (DPN) in 
DUPIMA is corrected for the fact that there is no demand for 25-kg piglets from fattening 
farms within quarantine zones. 
DUPIMA assumes that the national supply of hogs (SHN) is equal to the national demand 
for piglets (DPN) 17 weeks before, corrected for 2 % hog mortality. Since piglets 
purchased 17 weeks earlier on the market and now situated in a quarantine zone cannot 
be supplied on the hog market, a further correction has to be made. However, some farms 
have not only a multiplier unit but also a fattening unit. On such a farm, piglets may pass 
to the fattening operation even within a quarantine restriction. If the quarantine zone is 
lifted in time, these hogs may be supplied onto the market. The correction factors for both 
these cases are calculated in EpiPigFlow. 
DUPIMA 
DUPIMA (Dutch Pig Market) is a sector-level partial equilibrium simulation model 
written in GAMS. Dupima models the Dutch piglet and hog markets using the same 
approach as Buijtels and Burrell. Imports and exports of live animals occur at both levels 
in the vertical production chain, and pig meat is allocated between domestic and export 
markets. Unlike Buijtels and Burrell, all foreign prices are endogenous. 
We assume that in the short run the Dutch piglet supply is completely inelastic. Long 
production lags (minimum 4 to 6 months) and the need for an expansion permit (taking 
over 1 year to obtain) restrict expansion in the short run. The production lags, uncertainty 
about how long a quarantine zone will last and the welfare slaughter compensation on the 
basis of the actual weekly pig market prices, will all encourage farmers to continue in 
production. 
The model DUPIMA 
The structure of the Dutch piglet market is described by the following equations: 
SPN, = /,(BS,.26,ZIt) (1) 
SPIt = /2(PPN„PPI„Z2t) (2) 
DPN1 = /3(PPNt,PHNt,Z3l) (3) 
DPEt = /4(PPNt,PPEt,Z4,) (4) 
SPNt = DPN, + DPE, - SPI, - fs (PPN„ PHN„ PPI, PPE„ Z2„ Z3„ Z4t) (5) 
PPI, = J6 (PPN„ PPNt.„, PPIt.„, Z5t) (6) 
PPE, = /7 (PPN„ PPN,.n, PPE,.n, Zé,) (7) 
where SPN = Dutch supply of piglets, BS = number of breeding sows, SPI = supply of 
piglets imported into the Dutch market, DPN = Dutch demand for piglets from fatteners, 
DPE = export demand for piglets; PPN = price of piglets on the Dutch market, PHN = 
price of hogs on the Dutch market, PPI = price of piglets in a representative import 
source, PPE = price of piglets in a representative export destination. Z, are other 
exogenous factors (including List A disease outbreaks in the EU, feed price, seasonal 
effects, time trends) and n = 1 and/or 2 lagged periods. The unit time period is one week. 
Equation (5) is the equilibrium condition for the piglet market, which implicitly defines 
the Dutch piglet price: in each weekly period, the piglet price on the Dutch market adjusts 
to equate total demand, net of imported supplies, to the domestic supply of piglets, which 
is assumed independent of current price. 
The structure of the Dutch hog market is as follows: 
SHN, = (l-m)*DPN,.,7 (8) 
SHIt = /8(PHN„PHL,Z7t) (9) 
SCIt = MPHN„PHI t ,Z8 t) (10) 
DCN, = /,o(PHN t,Z9t) (11) 
DHEt = /I,(PHN t,PHE t,Z,o,) (12) 
DCEt = / ,2(PHN„PHE„Z„ t) (13) 
SHN, = DCN, + DHEt + DCE, - SHI, - SCI, 
= /1 3 (PHN„ PHI, PHE„ Z7t, Z8t, Z*, Z10t, Z,„) (14) 
PHIt = /14(PHNt,PHNt.n,Z12,) (15) 
PHE, = ƒ,5 (PHN„ PHN,.n, Z,3.) (16) 
where SHN = supply of hogs from within the Netherlands, SHI = import of hogs, SCI = 
import of pig meat (converted to pig carcasses2), DHE = export of hogs, DCE = export of 
pig meat (converted to pig carcasses); PHN = price of hogs on the Dutch market, PHI = 
price of hogs in a representative import source, PHE = price of hogs in a representative 
" A pig carcass equals 87 kg pig meat. 
export destination. 
Equation (14) is the equilibrium condition for the hog market. The link between the two 
markets is modelled as //"all piglets pass to fatteners via a market decision. This is only 
an approximation to the Dutch situation, where about a quarter of piglets remain for 
fattening with the producer who bred them (Backus et al). 
Estimated demand relationships 
The behavioural equations were econometrically estimated with monthly data3 from 
1992-1996. The model was converted to a weekly basis post-estimation. Dummy 
variables for outbreaks of List A pig diseases were included in the model. Piglet and hog 
feed prices were tested in the model in equation (3), but both were rejected on statistical 
grounds. Cattle prices and chicken prices were also dropped from the equation after 
statistical tests. Monthly dummies and a time trend were retained if significant, but were 
not active in the simulation model. 
Equations (1) and (8) were not estimated econometrically. Equations (2), (3), (4), (9), 
(10), (11), (12) and (13) were estimated in a block by Iterative Three Stage Least 
Squares, using all the predetermined (exogenous and lagged endogenous) variables as 
instruments. All functions are linear. The foreign price equations (6), (7), (15) and (16) 
were estimated separately by Ordinary Least Squares. 
Parameter estimates and elasticities are available on request. The signs and magnitudes of 
the coefficients are all satisfactory, as are for the most part the t-ratios although much of 
the variation remains unexplained. 
If not indicated others, the Commodity Board for Livestock, Meat and Eggs (PVE) supplied the data. 
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Calibration ofDUPIMA 
The simulation model was first calibrated on monthly 1996 data. When the monthly 
model was converted to a weekly basis, it was tested on weekly 1996 data (where 
available), after which small adjustments to some intercepts were made. Non-negativity 
constraints on trade flows were imposed when simulating. 
Simulated scenarios and assumptions 
In 1998 we surveyed 10 "experts" from the Dutch pig sector on the likely trade policy 
reactions to a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands with and without emergency vaccination 
as an extra control measure. The survey strongly indicated that the European Union 
would accept the concept of régionalisation, i.e. quarantine zoning of whole provinces. 
This means that the most likely market scenario would be a regional rather than national 
export ban on all live pigs. If emergency vaccination is used, an export ban on pig meat 
originating from vaccinated pigs would certainly be added. The experts did not believe 
that the Dutch government would adopt any control measures, such as emergency 
vaccination, that conflict with EU policy, in order to avoid a total export ban on all Dutch 
live pigs and pig products. 
Therefore, we assume that there will be either restrictions on quarantine zones only (no 
trade in live pigs and of pig meat from these areas (scenario Q)) or that, in addition, there 
will also be a ban on all live pig exports. In the second case, we simulated two different 
scenarios. In the first (Q + exp) the demand for exported pig meat (DCE) is unaffected, 
whereas in the second (Q + exp + switch), some of the demand for live hogs (now 
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unavailable) switches to exported pig meat. In this case, the intercept of DCE increases 
by half the average number of live hogs exported each week in a non-epidemic situation. 
At the beginning of an epidemic a total export ban on live pigs for at least 1 week will 
always occur. Subsequently, if régionalisation is accepted and if the authorities keep the 
epidemic "under control", provinces without quarantine zones would be allowed to 
export live pigs (scenario Q). If the Netherlands does not succeed in controlling an 
epidemic or uses control measures that are not approved by other EU partners, a total 
export stop on live pigs would follow. In 1997-8, a ban on all live pig exports was 
imposed for most of the epidemic (Q + exp). The extent of any export switch from live 
hogs to pig meat is unknown. The consequences of a full export ban are probably 
somewhere between the two export scenarios shown (with and without switch). 
Economic Welfare Analysis 
We assume a vertical framework of factor and product markets, in which all prices, 
except those of piglets, hogs and pork, are constant. Following Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 
producer surplus includes only the quasi-rents accruing to inputs used in farming. Quasi-
rents accruing to marketing inputs are included along with the surplus of the final 
consumer in "consumer surplus". The welfare effects for the Netherlands are measured in 
comparison with the average simulated (non-epidemic) market situation in 1996. 
In 1997-8, the EU budget financed 50 % of organisation costs and veterinary 
compensation payments and 70 % of compensation payments for welfare slaughter 
measures (LNV). Other payments are funded partly by the Dutch government and partly 
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by the Dutch farm sector via contributions. In the 1997-8 epidemic, the contribution from 
the industry was very small. Therefore, to simplify we include it with Dutch government 
expenditure. 
Government expenditure is calculated by EpiCosts, which is an adapted version of 
EpiLoss (Meuwissen et al.). The compensation payments for welfare slaughter are 
calculated using the simulated weekly prices obtained from DUPIMA. Further details on 
EpiCosts are available on request. 
Consumer surplus (CS) 
The slaughterhouses and the processing industry operate under competitive conditions, 
which force them to keep their margin fixed in the short-run. It is assumed that the 
margin is equal to average cost per pig slaughtered and processed (PVE). A further 
assumption is that the slaughterhouses are distributed over the Netherlands in proportion 
to pig density. 
At retail level, we assume a flexible marketing margin. Dynamic margin adjustment was 
estimated econometrically using monthly data for 1992-1999. The change in the surplus 
of the final consumer is calculated using the consumer price per kg pig meat derived from 
the hog price per kg pig carcass and the margins of the slaughterhouses and the retailer. 
We assume further that a CSF epidemic does not change consumer tastes for pork. This 
assumption is reinforced by the study by Mangen and Burrell (2001), which found no 
evidence of a taste shift that might have been due to the 1997-8 CSF epidemic. 
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Producer surplus (PS) 
Producers belong to one of three subcategories (piglet producer, hog producer and 
breeding stock producer). In any given week, producers in each of these categories may 
be outside or inside a quarantine zone. Producers outside a quarantine zone fall into two 
subcategories: a) those whose pigs are sold on the pig market; b) those whose farms were 
depopulated in a quarantine zone that has now been lifted and who are now restocking. 
There are three sub-categories of producers inside a quarantine zone: a) those whose pigs 
are slaughtered and destroyed by welfare slaughter; b) those whose pigs are slaughtered 
and destroyed because the farm is newly detected or in a newly defined preventive 
slaughter zone and c) those with 100 % idle capacity because their farm was depopulated 
or emptied by welfare slaughter and repopulation is forbidden. These sub-categories are 
summarised in Table 1. The changes in their surpluses are calculated separately. 
Table 1 here 
Results 
Presentation of results 
InterCSF was used to perform 100 replications of the Dutch 1997-8 CSF epidemic. All 
replications began by identifying the same 37 infected farms, but thereafter the epidemics 
developed differently according to the stochastic specification of the model. To 
summarise the results according to size of epidemic, two alternative definitions of size 
were used: length of the epidemic in days and the number of detected farms. 
All replications were ranked according to each of these criteria. The average of the three 
replications centred on the 10th, 50th and 90th represent "small", "medium" and "large" 
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epidemics respectively. Table 2 summarises the key parameters for small, medium or 
large epidemics according to each criterion. 
Table 2 here 
Welfare changes of main participants 
The total changes in producer and consumer surplus, as well as the changes in Dutch 
government expenditure and the net welfare effect, are given in Table 3 for both size 
categorisations and for the three export market assumptions. Recall that "consumer 
surplus" is the net change in surpluses downstream from the producer. 
Table 3 here 
When foreign trade continues from non-quarantine zones, the reduction in national 
supply is not matched by a fall in total demand. Therefore, prices outside quarantine 
zones arise. Hence, producers collectively gain and consumers lose. With an export ban, a 
segment of demand is removed from the Dutch market. When the epidemic is small, the 
fall in demand outweighs the reduction in supply due to movement restrictions and so 
prices fall. Producers lose surplus. However, if there is a switch in export demand from 
live animals to pig meat, the price falls are reversed at the expense of consumers and the 
cost of compensation payments to the government budget. 
Distribution of welfare changes among pig producers 
The changes in the surpluses of piglet, hog and breeding stock producers depend on 
whether the farms are situated inside a quarantine zone or not (see Table 4). An overall 
gain to pig producers hides the fact that producers outside a quarantine zone gain, in 
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contrast to those in quarantine zones. Moreover, pig producers inside a quarantine zone 
are not a homogeneous group, being either piglet, hog or breeding stock producers. Since 
piglet producers that are not depopulated continue in production and sell their ready-to-
deliver piglets for welfare slaughtering, they may gain as well. Depopulated piglet farms 
suffer losses due to idle production, for which they receive no compensation. If 
prolonged, these losses may lead to closure of the pig business depending on the 
individual financial situation. For specialised fattening farms (hog producers), welfare 
slaughter leads to empty stables after a few months. Idle capacity, whether due to 
depopulation of detection, preventive slaughter or welfare slaughter may cost some hog 
farmers their business. 
Table 4 here 
In our calculations, welfare slaughter on breeding stock farms caused costs to the farmers 
as their pigs were compensated at the same rate as fattening pigs. So, as in the 1997-8 
Dutch CSF epidemic, the government may also opt in the future to pay higher 
compensation to avoid creating an incentive for smuggling breeding stock out of a 
quarantine zone. However, this creates an incentive to declare all pigs on breeding stock 
farms as breeding stock, whereas in reality, only a proportion of the female piglets will 
become replacement gilts and only a very small fraction of the male piglets are used as 
breeding boars. 
Government expenditure 
Table 5 shows that government expenditure to control the epidemic increases with the 
size of the epidemic, on both definitions of size. The total amount paid to compensate for 
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welfare slaughter depends not only on the number of pigs slaughtered but also on the 
actual weekly market pig price as simulated in DUPIMA. All other government 
expenditure depends only on the number of pigs slaughtered and/or of farms under 
movement restrictions, since the cost per pig in these categories are independent of the 
simulated market price. 
Table 5 here 
Welfare slaughter compensation is the biggest part of all government expenditure on 
control programmes. These payments are highly related to the length of the epidemic and 
the number of farms in quarantine zones. For the same epidemic length, more farms per 
week in quarantine zones led to higher welfare slaughter compensation due to higher 
weekly market pig prices. Reducing the compensation paid per pig under welfare 
slaughter or breaking its link with market price would decrease these costs, but could 
increase non-compliance. Measures to reduce the length of an epidemic will be more 
successful in limiting the compensation payments for welfare slaughter. Reducing the 
number of farms in quarantine zones by reducing either the duration of an imposed 
quarantine zone and/or the radius of a quarantine zone may be another measure to reduce 
the cost of welfare slaughter, but those two measures may increase then the risk of 
spreading the virus. More epidemiological research is needed here. 
The marketing chain and final consumers (not shown) 
When exports are banned, slaughterhouses gain as more animals are slaughtered 
domestically. This matches the reality of the 1997-8 Dutch CSF epidemic. Retailers gain 
in all scenarios, whereas final consumers always lose surplus. However, the relative sizes 
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of these changes depend on the size of the epidemic and the trade situation, and so the net 
welfare change downstream from the producer may be positive or negative. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our analysis yields some important conclusions. First, as long as trade continues from 
non-quarantine zones, producers collectively gain from the epidemic, assuming the 
package of control measures that were used in the most recent CSF outbreak. This result 
is independent of the size of the epidemic. It occurs because producers outside quarantine 
zones benefit from the higher prices caused by lower supply, and because the loss of 
some producers inside a quarantine zone is moderated by compensation payments for 
welfare slaughter. With a trade ban on live pigs and no increase in exports of pig meat, 
market price is weaker and so the gain of non-quarantined producers no longer outweighs 
the losses of other producers; collectively, producers lose. However, the total producer 
loss in this situation is inversely related to the size of the epidemic: the larger the 
epidemic, the greater the shortfall in marketable supply and hence the smaller the 
downward pressure on market price. 
Although a trade ban changes producers' collective gain to a loss, the net welfare loss 
increases by far less due to the offsetting changes in consumer surplus and programme 
cost. Therefore, although a trade ban - assuming no switch in export demand to pig meat 
- is bad news for the industry, policy makers should also be aware of the offsetting 
welfare changes downstream. 
Another striking finding is that the share of the costs going to compulsory EU measures 
(depopulation, setting up of a quarantine zone) is small relative to the cost of optional 
measures (preventive and welfare slaughter). In particular, the major share of welfare 
slaughter compensation in total control cost is worth noting. We note also the significant 
contribution from the EU budget, without which the net welfare losses for the 
Netherlands would have been much greater. 
Finally, our analysis strongly indicates that additional control measures to reduce the 
length of an epidemic and/or the number of detected farms could well be economically 
rational. For example, with a trade ban, the net welfare loss of a large epidemic is EUR 
633 million whereas that of a medium epidemic is just EUR 390 million. If the Dutch 
authorities had used additional measures costing less than EUR 243 million that 
guaranteed a small epidemic, net welfare would have suffered less. 
Additional control measures to keep the epidemic "small" in scale would be to start 
preventive slaughter immediately (rather than after 2 months) or to use emergency 
vaccination. Nielen et al. show that immediate preventive slaughter reduces the median 
length of the epidemic by half. Another extra control measure might be emergency 
vaccination. Mangen et al. simulated two alternative emergency vaccination strategies, 
assuming the availability of a marker vaccine, a reliable diagnostic test and political 
acceptance. Whether or not vaccinated animals are subsequently slaughtered, emergency 
vaccination could shorten the length of the epidemic by more than 50 %. Both these 
additional control measures would have produced a "small" epidemic rather than a 
"medium" or "large" epidemic. A smaller epidemic lowers the welfare costs for producer 
and consumers, as well as reducing government expenditure. Ethical and animal welfare 
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objections against preventive slaughter, left out of consideration in our analysis, would 
also be less intense. Clearly, more analysis is needed to examine the cost and benefits of 
various additional measures to reduce the epidemic. 
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Table 1. Subgroups of piglet, hog and breeding stock producers 
Subgroups'" 
/. Outside a quarantine zone ' 
a) Normal pig production. Pigs are sold on the market. 
b) After lifting the quarantine zone restrictions: Restocking empty places. 
Has not yet ready-to-market animals to deliver the pig market. 
//. Inside a quarantine zone 
a) Continues production: Welfare slaughter (with or without delay) of 
ready-to-market animals; weekly pig market prices are paid for pigs 
slaughtered and destroyed under this measure. Thereafter hog farms 
become empty (switch to H.c) 
b) Infected and depopulated, or preventive slaughtered; average non-
epidemic values are paid as compensation. Thereafter, no production 
(switch to H.c). 
c) Production interrupted (idle production); no compensation was paid. 
Note: 
a) Farms may switch weekly from one to another category. From subcategory 1 they may switch 
to II and back. Inside II they may switch from a) to b) to c) or directly from a) to c). When 
switching from I to II farms may enter either in a) or b) and only if they were in I.b) they may 
directly switch to H.c). 
b) Only not depopulated piglet producer may switch without interruption from II.a) to I.a). All 
other farms will switch to I.b) when quarantine restrictions are lifted. Only after that all the 
farm was fully repopulated and was back in a normal cycle, farms in I.b) will switch to I.a). 
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Table 2. Categorisation of the simulations according to different size criteria 
Length of the 
epidemic 
(days)a> 
Size of epidemic defined by the length 
Small epidemic 
9b> 
I0h) 
, , b ) 
Average 
STD 
Medium epidemic 
49b' 
50b) 
51b) 
Average 
STD 
Large epidemic 
89b' 
90b| 
9 1 b > 
Average 
STD 
259 
262 
262 
261 
2 
306 
307 
307 
307 
1 
428 
435 
446 
436 
9 
# infected and 
detected farms 
of epidemic (days) 
164 
355 
187 
235 
104 
458 
577 
296 
444 
141 
304 
483 
2467 
1085 
1200 
# preventively 
slaughtered 
farms 
241 
752 
538 
510 
257 
1100 
1166 
662 
976 
274 
1267 
1738 
2583 
1863 
667 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detected farms 
Small epidemic 
9b) 
10c) 
IIe ' 
Average 
STD 
Medium epidemic 
49e' 
50c) 
51° 
Average 
STD 
Large epidemic 
89c) 
90c) 
91c) 
Average 
STD 
271 
317 
299 
296 
23 
302 
397 
279 
327 
61 
290 
374 
458 
374 
84 
193 
197 
199 
196 
3 
288 
289 
294 
290 
3 
537 
541 
566 
548 
16 
300 
383 
539 
407 
121 
592 
1130 
672 
798 
290 
994 
1887 
2401 
1761 
712 
# farms in a 
quarantine 
zone 
3860 
7826 
6047 
5911 
1986 
9789 
9045 
5956 
8263 
2033 
11507 
12389 
17621 
13839 
3305 
4073 
4795 
6866 
5245 
1450 
5870 
7863 
7152 
6962 
1010 
8564 
8290 
17330 
11395 
5142 
Note: 
a) An epidemic is finished when the quarantine zone for the last detected infected farm is lifted. 
b) Ranking of simulation according to length in days. 
c) Ranking of simulation according to the total number of detected farms 
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Table 3. Changes in producer surplus, consumer surplus and government expenditures 
(*106 EURO) for small, medium and large epidemics. 
Scenario A Producer 
surplus 
A Consumer 
Size of epidemic defined by the length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Medium epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Large epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
412 
-226 
42 
502 
-73 
204 
529 
-50 
276 
surplus 
-388 
119 
-8 
-550 
-76 
-201 
-798 
-258 
-398 
A Govern-
ment 
-247 
-218 
-228 
-358 
-318 
-330 
-577 
-515 
-532 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detected farms 
Small epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Medium epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Large epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
415 
-277 
12 
454 
-251 
52 
506 
-100 
208 
-405 
156 
16 
-465 
116 
-29 
-658 
-134 
-271 
-251 
-220 
-229 
-289 
-254 
-265 
-450 
-400 
-415 
Net welfare 
effect 
-223 
-325 
-194 
-405 
-466 
-327 
-846 
-822 
-654 
-240 
-341 
-201 
-299 
-390 
-243 
-602 
-633 
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